Plaintiffs, an association that provided medical marijuana and an individual, appealed a judgment from the Superior Court of Orange County (California), which, after sustaining defendant city’s demurrer without leave to amend, dismissed a complaint asserting declaratory relief and civil rights causes of action challenging an ordinance that imposed criminal penalties for the operation of a medical marijuana dispensary. Nakase wade has employment lawyer San Bernardino and California.
The complaint requested a declaration that state medical marijuana laws preempted the ordinance, Anaheim Ord. No. 6067, ch. 4.20, § 4.20.030. The trial court instead concluded that under the supremacy clause, U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2, federal law preempted the medical marijuana laws. The court held that the Medical Marijuana Program Act (MMPA), Health &Saf. Code, §§ 11362.7 through 11362.83, did not amend the Compassionate Use Act (CUA), Health &Saf. Code, § 11362.5; thus, Health &Saf. Code, § 11362.775, authorizing medical marijuana cooperatives, did not contravene Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c). The complaint adequately pled a request for a declaration of rights under Code Civ. Proc., § 1060, and factual issues precluded resolving the state law preemption issue on demurrer. The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812 et seq., did not preempt either the CUA or the MMPA under the limited scope of preemption described in 21 U.S.C. § 903 because there was no conflict and the city had no power to enforce federal law. The civil rights cause of action was properly dismissed because the Unruh Act, Civ. Code, § 51, did not apply to enactment of legislation.
The court affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining the city’s demurrer to the civil rights cause of action, reversed the judgment of dismissal, and reinstated the declaratory judgment cause of action.
Petitioner longshoremen sought a writ of prohibition to restrain respondent, District Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District (California), from taking steps to enforce a writ of mandate and temporary restraining order directed against the California Employment Commission (Commission). Respondent directed the Commission to withhold payment of unemployment benefits to petitioners until a final hearing on the writ of mandate.
Petitioner longshoremen filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to restrain respondent, district court of appeal, from taking steps to enforce a writ of mandate and temporary restraining order directed against the California Employment Commission (Commission). Employers had previously obtained a writ of mandate from respondent directing the Commission to withhold payment of unemployment benefits. Employers had alleged the unemployment benefits were in violation of the Unemployment Insurance Act because petitioners had left work over a trade dispute. After obtaining the writ of mandate, the employers had filed an appeal with the Commission from the decision of the referee granting benefits to petitioners. The court granted petitioners the writ of prohibition, finding that, although respondent had jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandate, it did not have jurisdiction until the administrative proceedings were exhausted. The court determined that, until that administrative procedure has been invoked and completed, there was nothing that respondent could review because exhaustion of the administrative remedy was a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.
The court issued a writ of prohibition restraining respondent, District Court of Appeal, from taking steps toward enforcement of its writ of mandate and temporary restraining order directed against the California Employment Commission. The court found that petitioner longshoremen were entitled to a writ of prohibition because respondent was without jurisdiction to issue its writ of mandate where administrative proceedings were not completed.